Long Tail Liability for Canadian Directors and Officers
This new case, based on old alleged wrongful acts, hits home because it is a Canadian Company in the insurance industry that is active in the US but not listed on a regulated US exchange. The case involves a July 2011 class action securities suit against Fairfax
Financial Holdings Limited (USA) and its Pink Sheet OTCBB trading,here. The allegations are common “violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” and issuing “materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business practices and financial results.” These allegations surround certain reinsurance contracts and the alleged
concealment of its lack of liquidity. Even the significant alleged financial damage (“a decline in market capitalization of approximately $300 million”), and the lead plaintiff being a pension fund, is not a surprise in the securities class action world. The interesting thing is the class period of May 21, 2003 to March 22, 2006. This is a great example of the very long period that can exist between the alleged “wrongful act” and the ultimate litigation and resulting claim that is noticed to the insurer.
This case is also a great example of systemic risk in the D&O insurance business. The Fairfax case is not unique because “in November 2004 the SEC and Attorney General for the State of New York began inquiries into the use of so-called “finite reinsurance” contracts” and launched a number of investigations against many well-known industry players.
Systemic risk in the long-tail, high-severity products should be a key concern for industry-based insurance programs (reciprocals, risk retention groups, group captives.) These programs may have value as a risk-management, defence management, deductible/retention management, political lobby or loss control tool, but should be used very carefully as a pure risk transfer vehicle.
The risk management spin: the plaintiff lawyer’s website, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, here, provides the complaint, here, which details the alleged “gimmicks” used to “artificially inflate the value of its assets” as well as the “lack of internal controls.” Complaints and legal decisions can present useful information for corporate governance risk identification and loss control activities, and with every public case there comes an increased expectation that other boards and senior management will learn for such cases. Here are a few of the governance issues I took from this case:
- Procedures to assess whether finite reinsurance contracts meet the prerequisites for risk transfer,
- Product inventory and coverage / risk explanations and evaluations of traditional and non-traditional products,
- Use of “reinsurance accounting” or “deposit accounting” and the risk transfer test, and understanding of the local accounting practices,
- Evaluation of management assumptions for reporting of profit or loss in foreign private investments,
- Evaluation of consolidated financial reporting,
- Controls for reporting of intercompany purchases and sales, write-offs, advances and foreign currency accounting, receivables,
- Adequate internal controls and (discoverable) communication regarding those controls, including bid/quote tracking, expense guidelines,
- Public statement oversight for accuracy of details and forward-looking statements,
The insurance spin: don’t let your insurance broker convince you that the only way to get coverage for a securities claim is to purchase “securities coverage” or the “side C” insuring agreement as part of your directors’ and officers’ liability insurance program. This coverage is very valuable, but that value may favour of the corporate entity. Depending on the structure and fine details of your D&O insurance program, the addition of “securities coverage” could be damaging to individual directors and officers of the organization.
The Towers Watson, 2010 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, here, suggested that 54% of respondents did not conduct any independent review of their D&O liability policy. The survey did not comment on the breadth or value of that independent review done for the other 46%. My question would be if that review included all areas in the policy that presented a risk of limit erosion or limit exhaustion to the detriment of individual directors and officers (not just “insuring clauses” or “definition of insured”, but “severability”, “allocation”, “predetermined defence costs”, “exceptions to exclusions”, “final adjudication in the conduct exclusions”.) My assumed answer “no in 98% of the 46%”, because most insurance brokers will provide a “free audit” of an insurance program, and in most of those cases, you get what you pay for.
The survey also suggests that 60% of participants purchased Side A/B/C coverage, and 14% were not sure how their program was structured. 24% said their coverage was blended with other non-D&O coverage like employment practices and fiduciary liability (but this could also include professional liability, crime, and others, even workers comp.) This blending of “first party” and “third party” claim, “entity” and “individual” coverage, and “claims-made (and reported)” and “occurrence/sustained” triggers can create very significant complications for eventual claim handling.
On the issue of exclusive policy limits for independent/outside directors only 4% said there was some such coverage in place. 80% of public company respondents said they purchased an “Excess Side A” or and “Excess Side A with Difference In Conditions (DIC)” features. Note, Side A is the “non-indemnified” loss insuring agreement for individual insured persons, it is not specific to independent or outside directors.
The Fairfax case could become a very good example for insurance company risk management, as the case may be part D&O, party Entity Coverage for Securities Claims, part Insurance Company Errors and Omissions (professional liability), and part Outside Directorship Liability insurance. The insurance risk is that the defence costs, judgments and/or settlement loss may be only partially or not at all covered by any of these policies. But the reality is that though the class action securities litigation risk may be very public, the resulting insurance risk will not likely see the light of day. The lack of publicity of insurance risk means the learning opportunity and loss control lessons are much more difficult to find.
If you would like to learn more about insurance risk, securities class action risk, D&O/E&O/Fidelity insurance or loss control for publicly traded companies or insurance companies; or if you would like to have an in-depth review of your insurance program,
please contact me directly.
Greg Shields is a D&O, Professional Liability and Crime insurance specialist and a Partner at the University and Dundas (Toronto) branch of Mitchell Sandham Insurance Services. He can be reached atgshields@mitchellsandham.com, 416 862-5626, or Skype at risk.first. And more details of risk and loss control can be found on the Mitchell Sandham blog at https://mitchellsandham.wordpress.com/
CAUTION: This article does not constitute a legal opinion or insurance advice and must not be construed as such. It is important to always consult a registered and truly independent insurance broker and a lawyer who is a member of the Bar or Law Society of the relevant jurisdiction with regard to this material before making any insurance or legal decisions. All material is copyrighted by Mitchell Sandham Inc. and may not be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the express written consent of Mitchell Sandham Inc. Anyone seeking to link this document from any external website must receive the consent of Mitchell Sandham Inc. by sending an e-mail to gshields@mitchellsandham.com.
